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Abstract: On one prominent view, endorsed by several authors pursuing neo‑Gricean approaches, 
scalar implicatures like “but not both” in the exclusive interpretation of the conjunction or “A or 
B but not both,” are generated automatically by default in the absence of context. By contrast, 
the contextualist view holds that scalar implicatures arise only when licensed by the context. We 
addressed this dispute by performing a sentence-picture verification task experiment, comparing 
the processing of two connectives in Hungarian: és (“and”) and vagy (“or”). Crucially, the veri‑
fication task required only a shallow processing of the meaning of target sentences. The results 
suggest that in such a task, while the entailment of the connective and was computed automati‑
cally, the implicature of or was not activated. This finding speaks against defaultism, and favors 
contextualist approaches to generalized conversational implicatures.
Keywords: connectives; disjunction; implicature; shallow processing; contextualism; Relevance 
Theory 
1. Defaultist and Contextualist Approaches to Scalar Implicatures
On one prevailing view, endorsed by some prominent work pursuing a neo‑Gricean approach 
(e.g., Levinson 2000; Landman 2000; Chierchia 2004), scalar implicatures such as “but not 
both” in the exclusive interpretation of the conjunction or “A or B but not both” are gener‑
ated automatically by default. One may distinguish between a strong version of defaultism, 
according to which implicatures are not effortful at all (e.g., Levinson 2000) and a weak ver‑
sion, according to which implicatures arise by default (even when a context is lacking) but they 
nevertheless (may) incur extra processing cost. On another, equally influential view, scalar 
implicatures only arise when required by the context (e.g., Sauerland 2004; Van Rooij and 
Schulz 2004; Geurts 2011). The latter, contextualist view is advocated by Relevance Theory 
(RT), according to which scalar implicatures are generated only in contexts in which they are 
relevant in the technical sense that they yield a significant cognitive effect at a reasonable 
processing cost (Sperber and Wilson 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2012; Carston 1998). Although 
some recent psycholinguistic experiments, performed to assess the opposing predictions of 
these two major theories of the way scalar implicatures arise, apparently disfavor the defaultist 
view (Noveck and Posada 2003; Bott and Noveck 2004; Breheny, Katsos, and Williams 2006; 
Katsos 2006; Huang and Snedeker 2009; Zondervan 2010), the results have been contested 
ISTVÁN FEKETE, MÁTYÁS GERŐCS, ANNA BABARCZY, BALÁZS SURÁNYI
171
SbornikEvo1.indb   171 29.4.2014   0:20:31
(Feeney et al. 2004; Degen et al. 2009; Grodner et al. 2010; see also Zondervan’s [2010] meth‑
odological criticism of some of the experiments that have been interpreted as supporting the 
contextualist view).
2. A Previous Experiment on the Processing of Disjunction
An experimental study of particular relevance to our own is Chevallier et al. (2008).1 This 
investigation assessed in three experiments the effects of contrastive stress on the disjunction 
or. Disjunctions can be enriched from a logical reading (the inclusive meaning) to an exclusive 
reading (A or B “but not both”). Chevallier and her colleagues demonstrated that both a visual 
and prosodic contrastive focus on or affected the enrichment. 
It is a common view, also shared by Relevance Theory, that implicatures in general 
(including the exclusive implicature at hand) arise in an effortful manner. Assuming that 
visual or prosodic prominence makes the disjunctive expression (more) relevant in a Rele‑
vance Theoretic sense, by making the processing of the disjunction less costly (see also Van 
Rooij and Schulz [2004] on how focus facilitates scalar implicatures), Chevallier and her 
colleagues predicted that sentences such as You can have the meat course or the fish course 
will be interpreted with a lower rate of exclusive implicatures than You can have the meat 
course OR the fish course, with the disjunction marked as prominent visually or prosodi‑
cally. Indeed, they found that making or prominent significantly increased the proportion of 
exclusive readings (cf. also Zondervan 2010). This result speaks in favor of contextualist 
approaches to scalar implicatures, as it shows that their generation is affected by prominence 
relations in the sentence.2
The strategy of Chevallier at al.’s experiment was to try to facilitate implicatures. Empir‑
ical studies in the realm of the psychopragmatics of implicatures often seek to do the opposite, 
i.e., to reduce the likelihood of implicatures through an experimentally increased processing 
load. In the experiment to be presented in this paper, we employed a strategy different from 
both of these: our experiment examined the effect of decreasing cognitive effort on the com‑
putation of a scalar implicature.
3. The Experiment
3.1  The Paradigm
The experimental task involved a form of “shallow” processing (cf. the concepts of “good-
enough,” or “shallow” cognitive representations in experimental work by Ferreira, Bailey, and 
Ferraro [2002] and Louwerse and Jeuniaux [2010], respectively). We tested the processing 
1  See also Paris (1973), whose study contains results from the testing of the (offline) interpretation of 
disjunction in adult controls. The disjunctions tested by Paris differ from those in our experiment in that 
they linked two complete propositions rather than two phrases. Pijnacker et al. (2009) report that in a neutral 
context, normal controls derive the exclusive implicature of disjunction at a rate of 54%. The interpretation 
of the latter result requires caution, as enforcing the lack of a discourse context in an experimental stimulus 
is notoriously difficult. When no context is given, subjects may still “project” contexts of their own in the 
course of processing sentence interpretation.
2  Response times for the exclusive readings were not different, regardless of whether contrastive stress 
was used or not. In other words, while intonation altered how the sentence was interpreted, it did not alter the 
time‑course for the inference.
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of the connectives és (“and”) and vagy (“or”) in Hungarian in a sentence-picture verification 
task similar to those used in the mental simulation literature (e.g., Stanfield and Zwaan 2001; 
Zwaan, Stanfield, and Yaxley 2002). Each picture was preceded by a sentence describing a sce‑
nario with two objects appearing as NPs conjoined either by and or by or (Connective Type), 
e.g., John peeled the orange and/or the banana. The state of the two objects either matched 
or mismatched (Congruence) the scenario explicitly described in the previous sentence. For 
example, in the mismatching condition of and‑sentences only one of the two objects was 
peeled (incongruently with the entailment of and). In the case of or‑sentences, both objects 
were peeled in the mismatching condition (incongruently with the implicature of or). Figure 1 
illustrates the crucial manipulation of the objects in our experiment. The upper set of pictures 
is consistent with the implicature of or, viz. “and not both,” while the one below it is consistent 
with the logical meaning of or (“and maybe both”).
Figure 1. Example of congruent ver-
sus incongruent picture stimuli in our 
experiments. Test sentence: 
John peeled the orange or the banana. 
The participants’ task was unrelated to both Connective Type and Congruence: they had to decide 
if both of the two objects had been mentioned in the previous sentence or not (without consid‑
ering the states of the objects depicted). The dependent measure was response time to picture 
stimuli. 
As the implicature associated with or would not yield any cognitive effect in terms of the 
task itself, on Relevance Theoretic assumptions it is predicted not to arise. By contrast, on the 
defaultist view (whether the strong or the weak version is considered) the implicature is expected 
to be generated automatically.
The experimental paradigm that we adopted deserves a comment before we describe the 
experiment in more detail. As already pointed out, the task we employed requires only “shallow” 
processing of the test sentences. Our design is probably the closest to that used by Stanfield and 
Zwaan (2001), who asked participants to decide whether or not pictures depicted the actions 
described in previously presented sentences. The actions described either a vertical or hori‑
zontal orientation, such as driving a nail into the wall or into the ceiling. The results showed that 
their subjects responded more quickly to the pictures that described the same orientation as the 
action described. Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) conclude that the participants activated perceptual 
imagery of the action described in the sentence and this caused the effect.
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Along similar lines, Richardson et al. (2003), for example, showed a direct connection 
between perceptual and conceptual representations. They demonstrated that the compre‑
hension of verbs that encode horizontal or vertical schemas, such as push, evokes spatial 
representations. The processing of such verbs interacted with shape discrimination along 
the horizontal or vertical axis. Other investigations also demonstrate that motion words 
affect the detection and perception of visual motion (e.g., Kaschak et al. 2005). Scorolli 
and Borghi (2007) asked their subjects to judge whether sentences containing a verb and 
a noun made sense. Participants had to respond either by pressing a pedal or speaking into 
a microphone. The verbs described actions that were performed with the mouth, hands, 
or the feet. Results showed that response times with the microphone were fastest with 
sentences encoding “mouth-verbs” and response times with the pedal were fastest with 
sentences encoding “foot-verbs.”
The general interpretation of this body of experimental evidence is that words evoke 
analogous perceptual and motor representations that are associated with the real‑world 
referents of the words that they refer to, and this affects reaction times. What is sig‑
nificant from the perspective of our own experiment is that even in such “shallow” pro‑
cessing tasks, rather subtle differences in meaning actually get processed, as revealed by 
the response time data.
3.2  Method
3.2.1 Participants
Seventy‑seven Hungarian students from Budapest participated in the experiment for course 
credit (Mean age: 22.5, Age range: 17–32; 33 female and 44 male participants). The data 
of seven participants were discarded because their overall accuracy was under 75%. All the 
participants were native speakers of Hungarian.
3.2.2 Stimuli
32 critical sentences and 64 filler sentences were constructed. Critical trials (a sentence con‑
taining a connective and a picture stimulus with the objects) required an affirmative response 
to a yes/no question, while filler sentences required a negative response in 48 trials, and in 16 
trials an affirmative response. In other words, in half of the trials the picture stimuli required 
a positive response, and in the other half a negative response. None of the sentences was 
ambiguous in terms of meaning.
The critical sentences were counterbalanced in four between‑subject lists. These four 
pseudo‑randomly organized intra‑group lists were created in order to counterbalance items 
and conditions (incomplete counterbalancing technique). Each list included one of four pos‑
sible versions, with 20 participants assigned to each list randomly. Each participant saw only 
one list, and each participant read each sentence once. Each sentence was presented with 
every Connective Type (and/or) across the experiment. Each item was tested equally often 
in each condition, and each subject received an equal number of items in each condition. 
Because lists were included only to reduce error variance, effects involving lists are not 
discussed in further detail. Reading time data were collapsed across lists. 
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3.2.3 Procedure
Participants were first presented with an instruction screen. They were asked to read the sen‑
tences that appeared on the computer screen and press the SPACE key if they had read the 
sentence. They were told that after every sentence they would see a picture with two objects; 
their task was to decide if both of the objects had been mentioned in the previous sentence or 
not. They were also instructed not to pay attention to the state of the objects. Each participant 
was tested individually in one session lasting approximately 12 minutes. Participants first com‑
pleted a practice phase, in which they were familiarized with the logic of the experiment. One 
trial consisted of a sentence and a picture stimulus. The sentence appeared in the center of the 
center of the computer screen. After the participant read the sentence, a picture appeared. The 
mean response times to the picture stimuli were collected. The sentences appeared one after 
the other with a fixation cross appearing between trials for 1000 ms. There was no set limit 
on response time at the point of the pictures or the sentences; however, subjects were asked to 
react to picture stimuli as quickly as possible because verification time was measured at the 
point when the pictures were shown. The trials were randomized across participants. We used 
E‑Prime to run our experiment.
4. Results and Discussion
The practice trials were excluded from the analyses, as were the filler items. Erroneous trials – 
where a wrong answer was given to the picture stimuli – were also excluded from the analyses. 
The data of seven participants were discarded (overall accuracy under 75%). Missing values 
were not replaced cellwise. The means of the median reading times of the critical trials were 
taken. The picture verification times were the primary focus of the analysis but we were also 
interested in the reading times of sentence stimuli. The table below illustrates the mean picture 
verification times (and SDs) in the four conditions:
Condition Mean (ms) Standard deviation (SD) Number of Participants
AND_match 1124.41 295.13 66
AND_mismatch 1269.83 445.35 66
OR_match 1193.82 346.94 66
OR_mismatch 1170.45 346.33 66
Table 1. Mean verification times (ms) of the picture stimuli in the four conditions.
Mean picture verification times were first analyzed in a participant-based 2*2 ANOVA model 
with Connective Type (two levels: and/or) and Picture Congruence (two levels: match/mismatch) 
as within-participants factors. We found a significant interaction between Connective Type and 
Picture Congruence, F(1, 65) = 12.224, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.158, indicating that the two connectives 
behave differently in our experiment. The main effect of Congruence is significant, F(1, 65) = 
6.825, p = 0.011, ηp
2 = 0.095. However, Connective Type does not reveal a significant main effect; 
F(1, 65) = 0.358, p = 0.552, ηp
2 = 0.005. Since we found a significant interaction, the criticism 
that participants just scanned the nouns in the sentences, skimming over the connectives, can be 
ruled out. The figure below depicts the mean picture verification times in the Connective Type 
and Picture Congruence conditions:
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Simple effects were also examined, applying Bonferroni‑correction: the alpha level of every 
comparison was adjusted according to the Bonferroni formula, which in our case is tantamount 
to multiplying the alpha level by four because we were interested in only four critical compari‑
sons. Most importantly, pictures after and‑sentences in the matching picture condition were 
verified significantly faster than mismatching pictures, t(65) = -3.628, p = 0.004 (Bonferroni 
corrected). Crucially, however, the same effect was not revealed in the set of or‑sentences, 
t(67) = 0.897, p = 0.999 (Bonferroni corrected; uncorrected p = 0.373).
Mismatches are generally expected to slow down reaction times, compared to the matching 
condition. This is indeed what happened after and‑sentences, but this was not the case after or‑
sentences. The lack of a slow‑down after or‑sentences is expected if the exclusive implicature of 
or was not generated. The lack of the exclusive implicature is predicted on the contextualist view, 
since it was irrelevant to the task. On (both strong and weak) defaultist approaches, the implica‑
ture is expected to be generated even in such cases. Then either the mismatch with the picture, 
or both that and the generation of the implicature itself (see, e.g., Noveck and Posada 2003; Bott 
and Noveck 2004; Breheny, Katsos, and Williams 2006; De Neys and Schaeken 2007; Huang 
and Snedeker 2009) would be predicted to cause a slow‑down in the or‑mismatch condition (cf. 
Shetreet et al.’s forthcoming fMRI study), contrary to fact. 
Pictures in the and-match condition were verified faster than those in the or‑match condi‑
tion, t(67) = -2.531, p = 0.028 (Bonferroni corrected). Concentrating on just this difference, one 
could potentially attribute this to the extra processing cost incurred by generating the exclusive 
implicature of or. However, this interpretation is hard to maintain in view of the fact that was just 
discussed, namely that the mismatch of the allegedly generated implicature with the picture had 
no effect. (Furthermore, this interpretation is not even available on a strong defaultist approach, 
according to which implicature generation is not only automatic, but also has no cost; e.g., 
Levinson 2000.) Instead, the longer verification times for the or‑match condition can be attrib‑
uted to an essential difference in complexity between the meanings of the conjunction and and 
the disjunction or. In order to capture the interpretation of disjunctions in modal environments, 
Figure 2. Mean verification 
times (ms) of the picture stim-
uli in the two connective type 
conditions.
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several recent studies have analyzed disjunction as having a more complex meaning than con‑
junction. According to Zimmermann (2000), the semantics of disjunction can be described as the 
conjunction of (possibility) modal propositions. Thus, informally speaking, a disjunctive sen‑
tence such as “A or B” is interpreted as “Possibly A and possibly B.” Others, including Simons 
(2005) and Alonso‑Ovalle (2006), have argued that disjunctions introduce sets of propositional 
alternatives into the semantic derivation. On either of these two types of approaches, the more 
complex meaning of the disjunction may arguably take longer to construct and, especially, to 
verify than that of an ordinary conjunction. (Although no verification related to the interpreta‑
tion of the conjunction and the disjunction was part of our “shallow processing” task, it is clear 
from the results discussed thus far that such verification did involuntarily take place during the 
processing of the sentence‑picture stimulus pairs.)
Pictures in the and-mismatch condition were reacted to significantly more slowly than those 
in the or‑mismatch condition, t(65) = 2.638, p = 0.02 (Bonferroni corrected). This difference is 
explained straightforwardly if there was an actual mismatch between the picture stimulus and the 
interpretation assigned by the participants to the sentence only in the and‑mismatch condition, 
but not in the or‑mismatch condition. There was no genuine discrepancy between the sentence 
and the picture stimulus in the latter condition if, as we are assuming, the exclusive implicature 
of the disjunction did not get generated in this task. On defaultist approaches, according to which 
the exclusive implicature must have been generated in the or‑sentences, the longer response time 
associated with the and‑mismatch conditions than with the or-mismatch conditions is difficult 
to account for. Perhaps one possibility is to assume that in some sense the and‑mismatch condi‑
tions, in which the mismatch is due to a semantic entailment of the conjunction, lead to a stronger 
discrepancy than does the implicature of the disjunction. But that assumption rests on dubious 
grounds in that both the entailments of conjunction and the exclusivity implicature of disjunction 
are arguably part of the truth conditions of the respective sentence types (see Carston [2004] for 
a forceful defense of this position). The differences between the two may only lie in how effortful 
they are to generate or to cancel, but both of these considerations would predict the opposite of 
what we found, i.e., it is the or‑mismatch condition that should have incurred longer response 
times than the and‑mismatch condition.
We also analyzed the mean reading times of the sentences before the picture stimuli to deter‑
mine if the two Connective Types are processed differently during reading. As or‑constructions 
may in general be associated with an implicature, they could in principle be harder to process in 
reading than and‑constructions. If, contrary to our own assumptions, an exclusivity implicature 
had been calculated during the reading of the or-sentences, then we might find longer reading 
times for the or‑sentences than for the and‑sentences (note that in Hungarian the disjunction 
itself, i.e., vagy, is even a longer word than the conjunction és). Nevertheless, we found that 
the and‑sentences (Mean: 1980.29 ms, SD: 608.22 ms) were not read differently from the 
or‑sentences (Mean: 2046.22 ms, SD: 601.77 ms), t(67) = -1.324, p = 0.190). This finding is 
predicted by our assumption that the disjunction was not associated with an implicature in the 
experimental task. Note that this result does not argue specifically in favor of that assump‑
tion, but it is straightforwardly compatible with it. If one were to assume that the implicature 
had actually been generated, then the same result could be explained away by assuming that 
the extra processing cost this incurred did not manifest itself during the reading of the target 
sentences themselves, which contained the conjoined and disjoined phrases in a sentence-final 
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position. Alternatively, a strong defaultist approach, according to which implicatures incur no 
extra cost, also predicts a lack of difference in reading times. 
We close our discussion by mentioning a potential criticism of the experimental task itself. 
One might suggest that the matching and mismatching picture stimuli differed inherently in terms 
of verification times, causing some of our results to be confounded. Specifically, it is in principle 
possible that an unpeeled banana is easier to verify than a peeled one on the basis of the principles 
of familiarity and prototypicality. This possibility, however, can be excluded. First, a difference 
in familiarity/prototypicality was present in only some of the pictures. Second, there was no 
significant difference between matching and mismatching conditions in the or‑condition. This is 
unexpected if the non‑prototypicality of mismatching pictures had an effect.
5. Conclusions
In this study we reported on the results of an experiment examining the scalar implicature associ‑
ated with disjunction with the aid of a task requiring “shallow processing.” Overall, the results 
suggest that in such a task, while the entailment of the connective and was computed automatically, 
the implicature of or was not activated. This finding speaks against (both strong and weak versions 
of) defaultism, according to which generalized conventional implicatures are generated by default, 
in the absence of context, and favors contextualist approaches. The results are predicted straight‑
forwardly by basic principles of Relevance Theory, according to which a scalar implicature is more 
likely to be generated if its relevance, i.e., the ratio of the positive cognitive effect that it can achieve 
and the processing cost it requires, is high. As the potential positive cognitive effect in our experi‑
mental task was extremely low, the implicature was simply not worth processing.
From a broader perspective, our results indicate that “shallow” processing tasks are a prom‑
ising experimental tool for psycholinguistic experimental research at the semantics/pragmatics 
interface more generally. 
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